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Précis
Several proposals for addressing the “replication crisis” in social psychology have been advanced in
the recent literature. In this paper, we argue that the “crisis” be interpreted as a disciplinary social
dilemma, with the problem facing early-career researchers being especially acute. To resolve this
collective action problem, we offer a structural solution: as a condition of receiving their Ph.D. from
any accredited institution, graduate students in psychology should be required to conduct, write up,
and submit for publication a high-quality replication attempt of at least one key finding from the
literature, focusing on the area of their doctoral research. We consider strengths, weaknesses, and
implementation challenges associated with this proposal, and call on our colleagues to offer critical
response.
The Replication Crisis as a Social Dilemma
Social dilemmas—situations in which collective interests are at odds with private interests—are
an enduring feature of the modern world (Hardin, 1968). Social dilemmas have two fundamental
characteristics: first, that each individual receives a higher payoff for defecting from what is in
the collective interest (e.g., using all of the available resources for one’s own advantage) than for
cooperating, regardless of what other individuals do; and second, that all individuals are better off
if they all cooperate than if they all defect (Dawes, 1980). A number of high-profile contemporary
issues can be seen as social dilemmas, including the global energy crisis, preservation of the
rainforests, and climate change. But social dilemmas can play out on a smaller scale as well, for
example within an academic discipline. In our own discipline of social psychology, for instance,
the ongoing “replication crisis”—see Earp and Trafimow (2015) for an overview and analysis—
could be seen as stemming in part from just such a dilemma: that is, a conflict between self- and
collective-interest.
To wit: while it is in everyone’s interest that high-quality, direct replications of key studies in
the field are conducted (so that one might know what degree of confidence to place in previous
findings from the literature), it is not typically in any particular researcher’s interest to spend her
time conducting such replications. This is for a number of reasons: (1) such replications may
be time-consuming; (2) they are likely to take energy and resources directly away from other
projects that reflect one’s own original thinking; (3) they are generally harder to publish; (4) even
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if they are published, they are likely to be seen as “bricklaying”
exercises, rather than as major contributions to the field; (5) they
(accordingly) bring less recognition and reward, including grant
money, to their authors—and so on (see Earp and Trafimow,
2015, for further discussion).
In this brief commentary we reflect on our position as early-
career researchers in the field of psychology facing a disciplinary
social dilemma: How can we, and others in a similar position,
do our part to conduct—and attempt to publish (see Earp
et al., 2014)—high-quality replications of others’ work, while
simultaneously moving forward in our own careers by publishing
novel and important findings?
Our focus on early-career researchers is deliberate. Compared
with more established researchers—i.e., those with tenured
positions at a university or similar—the problem we are
describing is especially acute. Consider the case of an ambitious
young scientist, who understands that she must “publish or
perish.” Since replication studies are harder to publish in the
first place, and are considered less prestigious if and when they
do come out, she might reason that she does not have much
of a choice here: as a function of time invested, every direct
replication that she conducts (and attempts to publish) will
reduce her chances, on balance, of achieving meaningful career
security, compared against the other researchers on her “rung of
the ladder” who decline to conduct such replications, and focus
instead on their own novel experiments.
The stakes of this dilemma must not be understated. For an
early-career researcher, failure to publish enough of the “right
kinds” of studies (i.e., novel, “ground-breaking” work), in the
“right” stretch of time (i.e., not too long after receiving one’s
Ph.D.), may result in failure to find work as a scientist. Thus, it
is not just a matter of doing a little bit better for oneself, at the
communal cost of contributing—by omission—to the crisis of
replication; but at least potentially a matter of choosing between
working as a scientist (at all), and being forced to give up and
pursue a different career. How, then, might the replication crisis
be addressed in a way that does not put early-career researchers
in such an untenable position?
The Need for Structural Solutions
In their landmark paper, Messick and Brewer (1983) identify two
types of solutions to social dilemmas: structural solutions and
motivational solutions. Structural solutions are those that come
about through coordinated and organized group action, and
often involve regulatory agencies or socially approved coercion
to constrain individual motivation in the collective interest. In
contrast, motivational solutions rely on individual preferences
and social motives, seeking to maximize those factors that
influence individuals to act for the collective good. To help
resolve this tragedy of the scientific commons, both structural
and motivational solutions should be considered.
Motivational solutions are clearly important in principle, and
they may work in practice for individual researchers. However,
we believe that psychologists—both new and established—
generally conduct their research because they have a genuine
interest in advancing the science. In other words, we would be
surprised to find out that (especially young) behavioral scientists
just aren’t interested in conducting high-quality replication
studies, insofar as they understand that these are important for
the scientific integrity of their field. Instead, it is muchmore likely
that they would be hindered by a recognition that their doing
so could put them at a distinct, even career-ending disadvantage
compared to their peers who spend more time on original
research. For this reason, structural approaches seem more likely
to be successful in the long run as a way of resolving this crisis of
replication.
A number of proposals for structural solutions have been
offered. These include establishing specific forums in which
to publish replications (Koole and Lakens, 2012), endorsing
publication standards that require internal replications by the
same lab that performed the original study (Roediger, 2012),
and greater openness about data and methods (Wicherts et al.,
2012). As Frank and Saxe (2012) note, however, most of these
suggestions “are—at their core—requests for busy scientists to
do something that is both less exciting and less rewarding than
conducting new research” (p. 600).
In light of this observation, Frank and Saxe offer a suggestion
of their own. What they argue is that “students in laboratory
classes should replicate recent findings as part of their training
in experimental methods” (p. 600). They go on share a
personal experience: “in [our] own courses, [we] have found
that replicating cutting-edge results is exciting and fun; it gives
students the opportunity to make real scientific contributions
(provided supervision is appropriate); and it provides object
lessons about the scientific process, the importance of reporting
standards, and the value of openness” (ibid).
We believe that Frank and Saxe (2012) are onto something
important. But we have a number of concerns. First, they seem
to be talking about undergraduate students, whose ability to
conduct high-quality replications may be limited, at least with
respect to certain kinds of studies. Second, the work of these
undergraduates would have to be finished, most likely, during the
window of a single term, which creates further limitations to this
approach. And third, Frank and Saxe seem to present “teaching
replication” as an option, which may simply re-introduce the
problem of a social dilemma: those professors who opt-out of
teaching replications would have more time for other projects.
A New Proposal
Considering both the strengths and potential weaknesses of
Frank and Saxe’s proposal, then, we asked ourselves: What about
shifting the focus to graduate school? Imagine the following
scenario: in order to receive a Ph.D. in psychology from any
accredited institution in the United States (and perhaps in other
nations as well), it is a requirement that one will have (1)
conducted a high-quality “direct” replication of a major finding
in their area (i.e., the area upon which their original doctoral
research will be based); (2) written up the replication attempt
to professional standards, no matter which way the data come
out, and (3) made a good-faith effort to publish the paper
in one of a growing number of high-quality online journals
(such as PLoS ONE) that publish reports of well-conducted,
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valid experiments regardless of their novelty or their perceived
“importance.”
This would address several potential problems associated
with Franke and Saxe’s (2012) suggestion, if it were to
work as a structural solution to the replication crisis in
psychology. First, Ph.D. students would bemore likely, compared
to undergraduates, to have the requisite skills (under the
supervision of their advisors) to conduct truly high-quality
replications. Second, they would not have to “cram in” a
replication attempt in a single term, but could take as long as
was necessary to do a good job, given the much higher stakes
that would be involved (i.e., they could not be awarded a Ph.D.
without meeting the above three criteria). And third, if it were a
requirement of every accredited Ph.D. program, then no single
graduate student could be at a disadvantage for conducting
replications compared against her peers in other programs.
One implication of this approach is that it would remove
the untenable burden from early-career researchers (post Ph.D.)
to spend time on replication studies during a critical period of
their career development, in a context in which, in any event,
such a burden could not be uniformly enforced. Moreover, since
all such researchers would already have contributed something
meaningful toward the resolution of the replication crisis, they
could feel free to spend their precious research hours on whatever
projects they deemed to be most advantageous either personally
or professionally. Finally, a new wave of Ph.D. students comes
through each year: if all were required to conduct at least one
replication study before graduating (according to the criteria
specified above), this would represent a major, and constantly
renewable, source of high-quality replications, focused on the
most important and/or contentious studies at the cutting edge
of psychological science.
Implementation
How could such a requirement be established? While numerous
practical difficulties would have to be addressed, at least some
of the following steps seem clear: (1) the idea would have to
be spread through the appropriate channels, and considered
seriously by influential researchers; (2) it would have to gain
widespread acceptance as a promising policy change, worth
putting into practice, and (3) it would have to be raised in
a decision-making context at the right level of authority such
that it could be adopted and/or imposed simultaneously upon
all accredited psychology programs nationally or internationally.
How this would occur is by no means straightforward. But before
any of the above steps could be taken, the basic soundness of
the idea would have to have been established—which means
subjecting it to critical scrutiny. Accordingly, we present it here in
a public forum, and invite discussion and constructive feedback
from our colleagues.
In the meantime, for those who do see some merit in our
proposal (i.e., department chairs, members of faculty steering
committees, Ph.D. supervisors, and other interested parties) it
could perhaps be instituted on a voluntary basis, in a more
piecemeal fashion. This would not, of course, fully address
the collective action problem—at least not all-at-once—since
students in replication-requiring programs would presumably
have less time, all else being equal, for original research compared
to their peers in other programs without the requirement. But
it could nevertheless start a wave of momentum, by which the
policy was adopted “from the bottom up” until it eventually
reached a critical mass. This would be especially likely, it seems to
us, if the early adopters were programs with already-outstanding
reputations for research excellence and scientific rigor in training
Ph.D.s, so that other programs would be encouraged to follow
suit. Moreover, the graduates of these prestigious programs
would have a number of compensatory advantages—due to the
strong reputation of their affiliation during training—that could
offset some of the loss in “original” research time due to the extra
replication requirement. Although an imperfect solution, this
would help address some of the potential bootstrapping issues
associated with the persistence of the underlying social dilemma
during the period of policy transition.
Conclusion
It has been argued that science is a game involving “rules
(not cheating), individual players (researchers), competing teams
(paradigms), arbiters (reviewers and editors), and the winning
of points (publications) and trophies (professorships, grants, and
awards)” (Bakker et al., 2012, p. 1; see also Mahoney, 1976). We
argue that for psychology to recover from the current crisis and
emerge as an exemplar of behavioral science, it is not enough to
merely change the motivations of the individual players and hope
that they stick to the rules. Rather, for the game of science, the
rules must be made clear—and enforced on a structural level.
Young researchers, with the very real pressure to publish
original findings, and to secure research grants in order to sustain
a living, pay a much higher cost by performing replications
than the comparable cost paid by a tenured professor. At any
given stage, the decision to expend one’s time and energy on
a replication study vs. a novel study is a zero-sum game: in
choosing to do a replication, one forfeits that time for working
on something else. And this commodity of time becomes
more valuable as the stakes get higher: with a greater need
to produce novel, high impact publications, the costs of time
spent performing replications also increase. Therefore, we have
argued that the burden should be removed from early-career
researchers, and shifted onto graduate students as a condition
of obtaining their Ph.D. Because this could in principle be
uniformly enforced (i.e., through major accreditation bodies,
or by mutual agreement among program leaders, working
“from the bottom up”), it has the potential to eliminate
any personal disadvantages that might accrue to individual
students. It would represent, therefore, in our estimation, a
powerful step forward in resolving the “replication crisis” in our
field.
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